Dual-systems frameworks propose that moral judgments are derived from both an immediate emotional response, and controlled/rational cognition. Recently Cushman (2013) proposed a new dual-system theory based on model-free and model-based reinforcement learning. Model-free learning attaches values to actions based on their history of reward and punishment, and explains some deontological, nonutilitarian judgments. Model-based learning involves the construction of a causal model of the world and allows for far-sighted planning; this form of learning fits well with utilitarian considerations that seek to maximize certain kinds of outcomes. I present three concerns regarding the use of model-free reinforcement learning to explain deontological moral judgment. First, many actions that humans find aversive from model-free learning are not judged to be morally wrong. Moral judgment must require something in addition to model-free learning. Second, there is a dearth of evidence for central predictions of the reinforcement account-e.g., that people with different reinforcement histories will, all else equal, make different moral judgments. Finally, to account for the effect of intention within the framework requires certain assumptions which lack support. These challenges are reasonable foci for future empirical/theoretical work on the model-free/model-based framework.
Introduction
Dual-system frameworks for explaining moral judgments have received much attention. These frameworks propose that there are two systems, such as a quick/automatic/intuitive/emotional system alongside a slow/controlled/rational system that govern our moral judgments (Greene & Haidt, 2002; Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001; Haidt, 2001) . Dual-systems frameworks are invoked to explain a set of apparently conflicting moral intuitions involving sacrificing one person to save five others, known as the trolley problem (Foot, 1967) . The trolley problem specifies that a runaway trolley is headed toward five people, who will all be killed if it strikes them. In the switch version, one can flip a switch that will divert the trolley to a different track in which it will kill only one person. In the footbridge version, the tradeoff is the same, except one must push a heavy man off a footbridge whose mass will stop the trolley in order to save the five. Most people think that it is permissible to flip the switch in switch, but wrong to push the man off the footbridge to his death in footbridge (Greene et al., 2001; Hauser, Cushman, Young, Kang-Xing Jin, & Mikhail, 2007; Mikhail, 2000; Petrinovich, O'Neill, & Jorgensen, 1993) . This is in some sense puzzling, because in both cases, the utilitarian calculation is the same: one person can be sacrificed to save five others. Why then, is it permissible to flip the switch, but not to push the man off the bridge?
Dual-system frameworks propose an automatic emotional reaction to pushing the person off the footbridge explains why footbridge is deemed morally worse (Greene, 2007; Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley, & Cohen, 2004; Greene et al., 2001 ). For instance, Greene proposes that because pushing a man is a personal, upclose, and direct form of harm, it triggers a negative affective reaction that subverts the rational, controlled cognition involved in reasoning that saving five lives is worth sacrificing one. In switch, because the act involved (flipping a switch to divert the train) is non-emotional, the utilitarian calculus dominates. Keeping with the literature, I will label the choice to sacrifice one person to save five others ''utilitarian," and the refusal to sacrifice a person for this end ''deontological." Recently, Cushman (2013) argued that the distinction between emotion and controlled cognition is too crude and fails to capture certain features of moral attitudes. For instance, both the utilitarian and deontological choices carry affective weight. People do not merely calculate that five lives is greater than one, but that saving five people is better than saving one (Cushman, 2013 
